Implementation of the Transformation of the German Navy

Wolfgang E. Nolting

Worldwide missions determine decisively the daily events of the armed forces. The deployment of soldiers and sailors for conflict prevention and crisis management tasks in even remote regions has become a political and military normality. The development into an operations-oriented armed Bundeswehr has also influence on the conceptual orientation of the German Navy. In order to be able to meet the challenges of the current missions as well as the ones of the future it is essential that the German Navy be consistently advanced as a contribution to the transformation process of the Bundeswehr. To that end it pursues the superior goal of improving the operability in a joint and capability-oriented approach. For that purpose the initiated development to an “Expeditionary Navy” is adhered to. It is important to enable the Navy to operate enduringly and from a great distance off foreign coasts within multinational scope and under threat conditions. The Navy must be capable of participating in expeditionary operations which are geared to a limited military objective with a fixed term and which must essentially manage without Host Nation Support.
In addition to that, the Navy bears part of the responsibility for the maritime security of Germany and its allies. In territorial respects this task is not limited to the protection of the German coasts against military threats. Especially for Germany , which is greatly dependent on the export business, it is of particular importance that the security of international sea transport and the protection of German merchant ships can be ensured. The German Navy employs the means of an “Expeditionary Navy” also for the maritime security.
The transformation goal of improving the operability in a joint approach makes use of a new concept: Despite geographic restrictions the action range of naval forces is not just limited to the sea as an area of operations, but extends also to coastal land areas and to portions of the air­space. Joint, interservice mission contingents are possible to be supported in all capability categories. It is essential to jointly capitalize on these specific valences in order to develop the sea as a basis for future operations. This new conceptual approach is called “Sea Basing”.
By “Sea Basing” we understand a conceptual approach to use the sea for a time-optimal, flexible, largely independent deploying, holding at disposal, commanding and controlling, protecting and supporting of own forces within the scope of joint and combined operations via and from the sea. The idea underlying the concept is derived from the Concept of the Bundeswehr and the more likely missions defined in it, i.e. to act in international crisis management and conflict prevention from sea with military means. Such acting will focus especially on joint, interservice scenarios, but also on combined multinational operations. The Navy supports the concept with its peculiar capabilities. It is about reconnaissance, for instance, when the employment of ground-based or air­borne means is not justifiable or advisable for legal or tactical reasons. It is about logistic and medical support, which we can render from sea. It is about command and control from sea. It is about the shipborne protection of troops employed ashore. It is, of course, about the effectiveness in missions/operations with the ability for selective, precise, and standoff-capable ship-to-shore acting which we want to provide as well. Such a use of the sea as a base is particularly purposeful in cases where the access to an area of operations is not possible due to lacking infrastructure or if the strength of the troops employed ashore is to be kept as low as possible. It allows the employment of closed and combat-ready units, which can concentrate themselves on their own core capabilities. Many combat support functions can also be carried out from aboard ships with a much lower threat for the personnel employed there. It is decisive, however, that the cooperation with the Army, the Air Force, the Central Medical Service, and the Joint Support Service is co-jointly fine-planned so that each Service can advance its capabilities in accordance with this concept. In a provisional basic conception of “Sea Basing” it is listed what the Navy is able to accomplish with the available means and capabilities today already. On direction of the Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff this document is presently being worked on co-jointly with the Services under the key management of the Navy to be clearly defined and completed by the end of the year.
From the basic conceptions of “Sea Basing” it is possible to derive new capabilities and projects. To that end, deliberations are being made in the Naval Staff, but also together with the other Services in regard to a strengthening of the mobility capability. The Concept of the Bundeswehr and the follow-up documents differentiate between strategic, operational, and tactical mobility. The differences lie basically in the distance. In addition, one has also to qualitatively differentiate between transport as an element and deployment as another aspect of mobility. In a transport, bulk cargo and package freight or personnel are transported. In a deployment, capability packages are moved to another location. Here it is about deploying mission-capable troops as close as possible to the area of operations. In the field of strategic transport we have meanwhile achieved a basic capability. In December last year a contract was concluded with Denmark , which allows the Bundeswehr quick access to the secured commercial sea transport (SCST) in a dimension of up to three roll-on/roll-off ships. But this is only part of the required capabilities. It is now essential to also create a secured military sea deployment capability (SMSD). Only such a capacity will make it possible to operationally deploy closed mission contingents — in differentiation to strategic transport — to their areas of operation also in situations where there is no or only poorly developed port infrastructure available and where civilian services cannot be used to the required extent. SMSD is ensured by military platforms and transshipment means. With the aid of SMSD it is possible to hold troops at disposal before an employment in the region, but outside a state. In addition it allows seaborne rescue and evacuation operations and the employment of Special Forces. Embarked land forces allow a flexible establishment of points of main effort, especially directly before an initial entry operation, because they can be deployed unhampered and rapidly as closed mission contingents in a sea­based array along the coast over longer dis­tances without being impeded by poorly developed infrastructure or adverse terrain.
The operational level of ambition given here proceeds conceptually and planning-wise from a disposition of forces resulting from the more likely tasks of a national military evacuation operation (1,000 servicewomen and service­men). This disposition of forces seems also adequate enough to significantly contribute to other multinational operational units like the EU Battle Group, which, among other things, must be capable of accomplishing the tasks “initial entry”, “military evacuation”, and “disaster relief/humanitarian assistance”.

Participation of the German Navy in Missions is complex

The Resolution 1701 was passed by the United Nations in August last year. With that, the foundation was laid for a mandated operation of initially one year which is known under the term “United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon ” or in brief UNIFIL. Since then Germany is participating in the operation in a command and control function and also with a respectively high-value force package. The resolution requires supporting the Lebanon in the fulfillment of its sovereignty. For the naval units this means in concrete terms to conduct sea surveillance and to cease illegal weapon delivery (gun-running) via the sea to the Lebanon . In its disposition of forces the German Navy is involved in the UNIFIL operation with two frigates, one combat support ship, two fast patrol boats, two mine countermeasures units, a tender, a nationally assigned SIGINT ship, four helicopters and an operational platoon of the naval protection forces as well as EOD/IEDD (explosive ordnance disposal/improvised explosive device disposal) specialized personnel with round about 900 sailors. The United Nations have asked Germany to assume command and control for an additional period of six months. Provided that there will be a political mandate decision on the extension of the mission beyond August 2007, Germany is going to honor this request.
The German Navy is continuously participating in missions in the maritime area at the Horn of Africa since 2001. Within the scope of operation ENDURING FREEDOM the Navy is presently involved with one frigate and one naval logistics unit ashore in Djibouti , totaling about 260 personnel. The permanent presence of an international operation at the Horn of Africa which has been going on for several years already has significantly — and that is not only Germany’s assessment, but also the opinion of our allies — contributed to substantially and demonstrably increase the security of the sea lines at the Horn of Africa.
A resolution from 2001 provides the respective basis for operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR in the Mediterranean area. Germany is currently involved in this operation with one submarine. We will continue to keep to this participation. If required, we will provide MPAs for this operation and also units, which, at the same time, are assigned to the Standing Naval Maritime Groups of NATO.
With regard to the situation in operations we must not only restrict ourselves to the mandated missions. The participation in units like the NATO response forces within the framework of the Standing Naval Maritime Groups ties up large numbers of personnel and materiel. These units are continuously ready to be deployed to a mission after additional political decision and, above all, at very short notice. Even if the political leadership and military authority put the focus naturally on the mandated missions, we must not neglect the “near-mission” tasks in the planning. This describes the setting on the basis of which the German Navy is progressing and adapting existing structures.

The Effects of Participation in Missions on Naval Personnel are immense

Basically we have continuously about 1,400 personnel of the Navy on missions and in near­mission commitments for already a longer period of time now. The percentage corresponds to about 20 percent of the total military personnel employed in Bundeswehr missions and operations. 20 percent means that the Navy contributes with its personnel and capabilities disproportionately high to the missions of the Bundeswehr. This is based on the fact that the share of the Navy according to the 2010 Personnel Structure Model and thus in the target structure comprises only about ten percent of the personnel strength in the entire armed forces. Realistically seen it becomes obvious that about 4,200 men and women are directly tied up by mission requirements, which include mission preparation, post-deployment activities, and the execution of the mission itself. On the assumption that the fleet has personnel strength of about 11,000 sailors it means that every second to third man/woman is directly involved in missions, in mission preparation or in post-deployment activities. This has, of course, consequences, as we cannot permanently deal indefinitely with such a high burdening of our crews.
Our attention is therefore particularly focused on distributing the burdens equally and equitably. For that purpose, we have implemented robust structures in the field of flotillas on operations. The augmentation of personnel in form of additional billets is intended to unburden as much as possible in terms of time those portions of the crews which are affected most — regulars and temporary career enlistees. In establishing this structure, a large num­ber of questions popped up. For example, according to which aspects is the personnel pool going to be filled and how will the rotation be arranged? Which of the organizational units, the flotillas, the squadrons or the individual ships will best be assigned the additional personnel?
And it became quickly apparent that the three command levels affected — Naval Staff, Fleet Command, TG Flotillas — and several personnel management offices had developed quite different conceptions about the purpose and function of this novel establishment of a personnel pool. What proved to be aggravating in the configuration was the fact that it was neglected to create a project organization in which all parties involved could have talked with one another. Only bit-by-bit was it possible to clarify most of the questions. We have to self-critically state that the system is still not running fully smooth. Nonetheless, the experiences available from the operational flotillas show us that the robust structures begin to function and that a first real ease of the burdens is materializing for individuals. With this manpower concept the German Navy is on the right track in realizing the compatibility of family and duty.

The Effects of the Participation in Missions leave Marks on the Materiel

Aside from the strains on the personnel, the stress on the material resulting from the operational re­quirements takes its toll, too. With today’s participation in missions we use both our units afloat and our airborne units to a disproportionate extent. In numbers this means 108 percent of the predetermined operating hours on the average. With some of the ship and boat classes and with the naval air force the average value is clearly exceeded at times. For example, the combat support ship reached an operating/utilization capacity of 209 percent in 2006 due to the fact that we have only two of them. Our frigates have one of about 148 percent and the fast patrol boats of 135 percent. This means that we have to invest. For with a planned service life of about 30 years we would — when taking the combat support ship as a basis of calculation — be in a phase after about 17 years from the commissioning where we would actually have used up the total planned potential of steaming hours. Similar figures apply to the fleet service ships which, with their 56 percent of scheduled operating lifetime, have used up 75 percent of their planned operating hours today already. It is thus essential to counter this development with creative and feasible materiel concepts in this field, too. And this is undoubtedly with the proviso to maintain capabilities in order to remain qualified for the future.

The Financial Needs of the German Navy are not covered by existing Budgets

In the Bundeswehr Plan 2008 – and this goes actually for the past few years – the field of maintenance and operation is permanently characterized by underfunding. It has been a superior goal for years to constantly increase the investment share within the scope of the avail­able financial and planning volume. Since the beginning of the transformation this intention was indeed possible to be realized which, of course, benefits all Services. But nevertheless, this development had to be paid with increasing problems in maintenance and operation. With the 2008 Bundeswehr Plan the Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff has now swung around to the disadvantage of investments in order to strengthen maintenance and operation. This, however, is still not in line with the requirements submitted by the Services. We can thus establish that about 52 million Euros are lacking with the Navy on average per year in the planning period from 2008 to 2012 when compared with the financial means regarded necessary.

Structural Changes in the German Navy are currently in the Process of Implementation and are beginning to take Shape

The German Navy has adopted its new structure within the scope of the transformation process. The two operations flotillas in the North and Baltic Seas were set up in summer last year. The Naval Office in Rostock was re-structured. The national element of a NATO Center of Excellence (COE) for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (CSW) was commissioned in the headquarters of Task Force Flotilla 1 in Kiel in this year already. Following the successful accreditation by NATO, the COE CSW will be additionally manned by NATO partner nations and thus yield international military expertise. Among other things it is intended that joint and combined concepts, operational principles/doctrines, and procedures for the cooperation be developed there. New technologies for combat in coastal areas, such as unmanned systems of all types, are also to be tested here. The COE CSW is to become a “think tank” for new tactics and procedures for missions/operations in peripheral and coastal waters. The results will then be capitalized on by their injecting into the planning and execution of operations.

New Means and Capabilities qualify the German Navy for the Future

With the Navy’s specialized operational forces a new unit was created in which specific capabilities for the mission accomplishment of the Navy and of the armed forces in total were combined. The three components of attack swimmers, mine divers, and boarding security personnel are employed in the entire mission spectrum of the Bundeswehr with focus on maritime environments. In addition, naval protection forces ensure the shore­ward and seaward security of maritime units and their locally fixed installations in the area of operations. Within the scope of force protection and because of their highly specialized capabilities the naval protection forces and the specialized operations forces make an indispensable contribution to the orientation towards an “Expeditionary Navy” and to the implementation of the “Sea Basing” conception.
The frigates of the 124 Class are meanwhile fully commissioned. With these vessels we have most sophisti­cated units at our disposal for air defence against aircraft and missiles. They have highly advanced sensor systems and a retrofit option for par­ticipation in seaborne ballistic missile defence. The Dutch Navy, too, is developing its frigates, which are mostly of the same design and construction, in exactly that orientation. We are involved in their trials, observe these tests very closely and want to at least retain the option to follow their developments in those fields where they are successful. And this also in order to make available this capability, which is highly prioritized in both the Concept of the Bundeswehr and in the Defence Political Guidelines and in the White Paper. We need them also urgently in the missions to relieve the F123 command and control frigates.
Four frigates of the 125 Class have been contracted. The parliament has approved their procurement in June of this year. The F125 will be optimized for multiyear stabilization missions. Their capability profile is primarily designed for maritime interdiction operations which is exactly that what we are particularly dealing with in current missions. In addition to that it is also capable of providing tactical fire support from sea to shore, and it will have the capabilty to provide shipborne support for special and specialized forces. It will be much more effective and efficient than our present ships. We have invested a great deal here in order to keep maintenance and running costs as low as possible throughout their service life. We anticipate from these investments that they will generate savings during the operations period. The 125 Class Frigate has a very innovative technological concept. If one wants to keep a ship on missions abroad without major repairs for periods of up to two years, then this means that the individual systems must, of course, have a very high reliability. In addition, the manning sustainability of such a ship requires a personnel allowance of two crews.
The commissioning of the first two K130 corvettes of a total of five ships of the same series is imminent. This weapon system is expected to lastingly enhance the robustness and sustainability in a multinational combine, also on operations in remote oceans and peripheral waters.
The second batch of the 212 A submarine is under contract and will be delivered in the years 2008 and 2012. The operational range of these boats will be substantially increased by their air-independent propulsion system. The boats have powerful sonar systems and the capability to conduct covert operations, and they can provide covert support for missions ashore, e.g. by reconnaissance support. Aside from all the asymmetric threats we must still be capable of making our contribution in regional conventional military conflicts. Here the submarine has its role in the three-dimensional antisubmarine warfare and in combating conventional surface targets.
The eight P-3C ORION long-range maritime patrol and ASW aircraft acquired from The Netherlands are presently made operationally ready in Nordholz. We need these aircraft urgently not only and particularly in missions, but also to relieve our frigates in the areas of operation. For example: a maritime patrol aircraft can well be employed at the Horn of Africa and it is requested in especially that area by the USA time and again. We assume that we will succeed in having one P-3C deployable and operationally ready by the end of the year.
We are worried about the delivery of the MH 90 naval helicopters, however, as the armaments council has decided to reduce the planning for financial reasons to just 30 MH 90 helicopters. The introduction date is presently again an open question, since technical problems cropped up in the areas of radar and navigation systems, and with the landing gear. The industry is called upon to develop respective solutions. As to the planning, we still stand by a procurement contract for the end of this year and/or the beginning of next year. But it is fore­seeable now already that the fielding will not take place as originally scheduled. This entails among other things that we have to look into alternatives such as the extension of the SEAKING MK 41 weapon system.
A third combat supply ship is projected in the Bundeswehr Plan 2008. We assume that we are going to have a conclusively negotiated draft contract for this third combat supply ship in April next year and are prepared for a parliamentary debate on this subject in summer next year. Based on the planning approach, a commissioning would thus be thinkable in 2012.
In order to continue to keep the Navy future­oriented on the right path, it is also required to initiate already now the planning for the period beginning beyond the next decade. It is essential to derive from the findings acquired in the wide subject fields of “Sea Basing” and “Maritime Security” new requirements for a future order of battle. I had therefore two new projects included in the Bundeswehrplan 2009. These are on the one hand support ships, which were given the working designation “Joint Support Ship” (JSS). With those ships the requirement for an ensured military sea deployment capability will also be taken into account in the medium term. The other project is to ensure the succession of the fast patrol boats of the 143A Class. The units assigned to the stabilization forces are to be replaced by six corvettes of a new type. And, as a principle, we must not shut ourselves off from new technological developments. Within the scope of options for missions directly off foreign coasts we will thus also consider the employment of smaller, if pos­sible, unmanned (sub) systems which are much more difficult to combat.

Status of the Navy in Missions is increasing

The role of the naval forces as an instrument of security policy has changed. In today’s globalized world the significance of the Navy in operations as a decisive instrument of German security is steadily growing. Terrorism, prolif­eration, and fragile state structures are the causal dangers and threats the armed forces are confronted with today. But also in view of Germany ’s economic, maritime export-determined dependencies it is imperative to take adequate precautions. In future it will also be more important than ever before to employ the capabilities of the Army, Air Force, and Navy in a goal-oriented and coordinated way. The conceptual approach to use the sea as a base for joint, interservice operations offers a future and task-oriented basis. The Navy provides the Bundeswehr with the required maritime capabilities, which are necessary to meet conventional and above all asymmetric threats at sea and from the sea. The Navy is thus of high relevance and it is going to progress in a way which will enable it to operate in remote areas and, if necessary, also under threat off foreign coasts, but primarily in multi­national integration in future, too. The price to be paid for that is high. The employment strains of our personnel and the stress loads of our materiel are immense. This requires us to consistently deal with creative and primarily feasible manpower assignment and material utilization concepts. As to maintenance, the studies on a cost containment are far advanced already. Here, we anticipate clear savings in future and thus positive repercussions on future investments, of course.
The Navy, just like the armed forces in total, is thus in a constant process of adaptation. When the parametric conditions change we have to adjust the structures and the organization accordingly and flexibly with the aim of improving the operability and keeping it continuously on a high level. And that is the actual transformation effort.    
           

By Vice Admiral (GE N) Wolfgang E. Nolting, Chief of Staff, Navy.