Security of Facilities and Objects

Bernd Frei

“As was communicated by the spokesman of the Federal Ministry of Defence, Thomas Raabe, in Berlin , there were three antitank grenades fired at the bivouac Camp Warehouse in Kabul . Nobody was injured”. Like this or similarly read the information in several daily newspapers in early July 2006. Reports of this kind keep popping up in the media in regular intervals. As a reaction to these occurrences the Federal Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Jung, was quoted in the newspaper “Hamburger Abendblatt” of 10 July 2006 as follows: “In reaction to the numerous attacks I have directed that the protection of the Bundeswehr soldiers be intensified”.
Missions abroad have become everyday reality for the servicewomen and servicemen of the Bundeswehr. The threat posed to our soldiers in current missions abroad has steadily increased and has clearly changed in the course of time. In the era of the Cold War, a conventional enemy with very similar training and equipment tailored training and equipment of the Bundeswehr to prevail against a symmetric threat. In today’s missions abroad for conflict prevention and crisis management including the fight against international terrorism the military personnel of the Bundeswehr is primarily exposed to an asymmetric threat. The servicewomen and servicemen are not only exposed to this complex threat situation in the accomplish­ment of their tasks, but also during the resting and recreational phases in their bivouacs.
The protection of bivouacs is therefore in the focus of the considerations regarding the security of facilities and objects. But these are by far not the only fixed facilities that are essential to be protected. The approach of the Bundeswehr exceeds the protection of bivouacs and comprises the entire spectrum of fixed installations used by the troops. In Bundeswehr usage such protection as a whole is therefore called the “security of facilities and objects” with the facilities being always part of an object.
When on missions, Bundeswehr forces are basically accommodated in facilities and installations in the area of operations. These facilities can be operated in host nation or rented objects or in connection with and/or without dependence on existing infrastructure. In most cases this will happen in bivouacs and this is why their protection is paid closest attention. These include also, e.g., medical treatment facilities, airstrips, port facilities, and militarily used logistic establishments. In addition to those, other facilities and installations not used by the Bundeswehr or allies can also be protected as part of the task. These are, for instance, government and administrative buildings, warehouses/depots of relief organizations, hospitals, airports, but also cultural possessions/sites, and residential areas of minorities. Depending on the task/order and a respective threat it is essential to protect all facilities and object. This requires an even more differentiated protective approach than it would be the case with just the bivouacs.

Threat in Missions

All considerations regarding an improvement and/or optimization of the protection and security in missions start off with the real, existing threat or one, which is to be expected. Experiences gained in missions prove that antitank grenades do by far not represent the only threat. Basically, friendly forces are threatened in missions by effectors from the air, from the ground and possibly by the broad range of ship-based weapons.
In protecting our own soldiers on a mission against asymmetrically fighting forces — which try to make up for the “conventional” inferiority in troop strength, equipment, and training by “unconventional” tactics and disregard of the rules of the humanitarian international law — the Bundeswehr has to face a far bigger challenge than in the fight against a militarily organized and respectively acting enemy. Such adversaries are aware of their inferiority in equipment, technology, and training and, for that reason, conduct the conflict asymmetrically to evade the tactical and technological superiority of the other side. Irregular and/or terrorist forces as well as enemies and individually acting offenders/bombers operating in accordance with the “rules” of organized crime who use armed ambush, assault or robbery and abduction tactics constitute a permanent threat which must be reckoned with in all areas of operations.
Static facilities and objects are preferred targets for attacks by terrorist groups because of their locations and structures and thus require special protection which is to be flexibly adapted to the respective threat situation. The assessment of the threat, the threat-related action and, if necessary, the acceptance of a tolerable risk determine all protective measures.
Enemy forces are basically able to acquire weapons, ammunition, equipment, and technologies available on the open market. This enables these forces to obtain the capacity to attack facilities and objects in a precise, robust, standoff-capable and night combat capable manner. In addition to these conventional means these forces may also have the possibility to employ NBC munitions or hazardous substances or to release them by calculated and well-directed attacks and to use weapons, am­munition and explosives banned according to the Geneva Convention.
Hacking attacks on our computer networks belong also to the means, which asymmetric enemies may have at their disposal. Another threat to our soldiers emanates from infectious diseases, which can reach facilities or objects through transmission from animals, humans or foodstuff. Furthermore, a threat can also originate from the civilian workforce who might leak information obtained by espionage to a potential enemy.
The security threat to a facility or an object is also determined by the location and locali­ties. In an urban environment a threat potential is to be expected which is quite different from that in undeveloped, open terrain. And it makes also a difference whether the facility or the object are located on a plain or contrary to that in a valley so that it is easily possible to observe or even to fire at the bivouac from the surrounding hills/mountains.
The experiences gained by the Bundeswehr in missions show in summary that the main threat to our soldiers in bivouacs emanates from an asymmetrically operating enemy using primarily unguided missiles, artillery shells, mortar grenades, effectors of most different types, improvised explosive devices or booby traps, respectively, as well as direct fire from small arms (infantry weapons, light antitank weapons) and shoulder-fired guided missiles.

Concept

The protection of our servicewomen and servicemen on missions can, irrespective of training and equipment, never be better than the overall concept behind it. This overall concept must be matured in a way that the protective measures based on it are fully optimized against all types of threats, but remain nevertheless affordable and cannot be bypassed by asymmetric forces through simple countermeasures.
If the protection is to be effective in every situation and also kept up like that in the long term, it must be laid out in a multistage system. Should one protection stage fail, the other protection stages will nonetheless ensure the survival of the own military personnel. Here, the first protection stage will be the indirect protection, which unfolds its effect by way of preventive measures in order to avert the emergence of a threat already in advance. Indirect protection can be achieved by training of own forces on the one hand and by efficient information gathering and reconnaissance on the other hand. Detailed knowledge of intended or planned attacks/assassination attempts by asymmetric forces is a precondition for taking appropriate measures in time in order to prevent the execution of attacks/assassination attempts. The second protection stage is the active protection, which is aimed at preventing attacks of enemy forces. This protection stage also includes active systems, which can detect a threat by means of sensors and subsequently alert own forces or combat the threat independently by appropriate countermeasures. Active protection is decisively supported by information superiority. Passive protection as the third stage is aimed at containing the effectiveness of an attack or its impact. It is mainly also achieved by threat-related personal protective equipment, material protective measures including protected vehicles and signature reductions in the entire spectral range, high mobility, and a resistant infrastructure.
One example for the passive protection of facilities and objects is the constructional protection. A bivouac, for instance, comprises the perimeter area with protective walls, access roads, fences, watchtowers, and fortified positions on the one hand and structural facilities or reinforcements including shelters or hard­ened accommodations on the other hand.
All individual protective measures in this multistage overall concept are subject to a complex interaction and manifold dependencies. The diverse individual measures for the protection of facilities/installations and objects can be effective in a combine only.
While the optimization of the training of our soldiers as a preventive measure is given special attention in the first protection stage, a realization of the second and third protection stage is possible only by means of optimized and compatible equipment. It is primarily under this aspect that the Bundeswehr intends to establish a test environment in which the protection of facilities and objects can be tested and further developed in order to be able to counter potential threats even more efficiently in future.

Training

With the concept of “Mission-preparatory Training for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management” (MTCC) it was succeeded to streamline large portions of the present, very time-intensive additional preparation for a mission by a reduction of redundancies and to integrate it as far as possible into troop training. Troop training becomes thus the mission training. As a result it was possible to cut the training period for a concrete mission to the portion of the MTCC add-on training.
During the training the soldiers will be imparted a standard basic capability for the subjects “patrols”, “checkpoint”, “endangerment by unexploded ordnance” and also for “facility/ object security”. On the one hand this is achieved by a consistent application of the respective “Rules of Engagement” (ROE); on the other hand, the experiences gained from the missions are also always injected into the training process.
With the “Directive No. 3 for Troop Training” which came into force on 1 October 2006 the training programs for “infantry supplementary training” have become compulsory for all branches of the Army — except for mechanized infantry, light infantry, paratroops, and moun­tain infantry. The main emphasis is placed on securing and/or protecting objects during the day and reduced visibility. With that, all elements, irrespective of their organic assignment to a force category, will be capable of assuming tasks in the field of facility/object security, which also takes account of the experiences gained in the current missions. It is furthermore essential to integrate new assets and equipment in the training. This is supported by the increased use of the central training facilities of the Army and the simulators and/or simulation systems available there which contribute to a more efficient shaping of the training.
Excellent training alone does not provide the exclusive and universal protection against the measures of the enemy. But it is the first and, at the same time, most important step to prepare our servicewomen and servicemen both mentally and physically for the mission.

Equipment

As stated in the concept, the effectiveness of the second and third stage is essentially determined by excellent equipment. An effective protection of facilities and objects commences with a comprehensive reconnaissance of the environment. Employed for this purpose will be both optical and acoustical sensors and radar systems. Their diverse sensor information must be integrated and processed. Depending on the threat, decisions are then made on the employment of forces and means. Therefore, numerous armament projects have already been initiated on the basis of this conceptual approach with the aim to improve the protection of facilities and objects, three of which are described in the following as examples.

Gunner’s Detection Equipment

With the gunner’s detection equipment it is possible to detect and localize sites/locations from where shots were fired which allows to initiate immediate countermeasures. These countermeasures can range from an alerting of the readiness teams up to deliberate fire; and this depends, of course, from the type of threat. Other factors, which determine the employment of countermeasures, are, for instance, the openness of the terrain as well as terrain elevations and depressions.
The stationary versions of this equipment are primarily planned for the protection of facilities and objects. The equipment volume comprises here among other things, acoustic sensor systems, video cameras and thermal imaging devices. It can be employed around the clock. First systems of this type were procured for the mission in Afghanistan in 2006. They will be further developed on the basis of the experiences gained in missions.

Command and Control Center “Facility and Object Security“

All information of the overall “protection” system will be gathered and processed in the Command and Control Center “Facility and Object Security”. It will thus become the hub for the protection of facilities and objects. Coordinated here will be, among other things, the graduated countermeasures necessary to be taken if, for instance, gunner’s detection equipment has identified a potential enemy. But this is only one example for a large number of information received here and which have then to be processed without delay in order to be able to adequately counter the threat with appropriate forces or means at the right time. Basically, all the planning and thus also the employment of all forces and effectors required for the protection of a facility or an object are going to be coordinated in this command and control center. The objective here is to optimize the protection by way of command control and employment of all forces and effectors from one central establishment. This command and control activity will generate a new effective instrument for the protection of facilities and objects.

Protection Against Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars in Close-in Ranges

The presently most comprehensive armaments project in connection with the protection of facilities and objects is the “ Close-in Range Protection Counter RAM (Rocket, Artillery, Mortar)” as it is called in military usage. This system provides the possibility to detect and track rockets, artillery shells and mortar grenades and to counter this threat for a facility or object by means of a computer-assisted employment of gun systems with appropriate ammunition. The special feature of this ammunition allows it to be individually programmed so that it can be employed in a threat-adapted way. For that purpose, the SKYSHIELD air defence system of the “Oerlikon Contraves AG” company is presently being modified and further developed. This system is intended to also detect and track very small targets in an even better way.
Although the protection of own forces is given priority here, an endangerment of the civil population by the employment of such defence systems is being further minimized due to the steady improvement of the ammunition. Last year, the Defence Committee of the German Bundestag appropriated considerable investment funds for the project “Protection Against Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars in Close-in Ranges” in order to ensure the procurement of these systems in the short term.

Protection is of Great Significance

According to the Concept of the Bundeswehr, the protection of the own forces on missions and in routine duty at home is being attached utmost importance. This is also the basic idea of all considerations, which deal with the subject of facility and object security. There were and will be great efforts in future as well to optimize the protection of our servicewomen and servicemen. The experiences gained show that the Bundeswehr is on the right track here. High-quality training constitutes the basis of protection. The employment of modern equipment and technology in especially the protection of facilities and objects allows to increasingly relieve the soldiers from routine work and, as a consequence, to have them available for accomplishing other tasks.
In spite of all the efforts it is not possible to guarantee hundred percent protection due to ever changing threat situations. This became again apparent on 22 May of this year when three rockets were fired at the bivouac in Feyzabad. Fortunately there were no physical and property damages. The concepts for the protection of the soldiers in operations need therefore to be constantly reviewed and must, wherever necessary, be adapted accordingly. The goal of guaranteeing maximum protection for our military personnel in facilities and objects will be intensively pursued in future, too.

By Lt Col (GE A) Bernd Frei, Assistant Chief of Section, Army Office.