“We need new capabilities to succeed on these

John Craddock

On 28 April 2008 the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General John Craddock, addressed the Manfred Wörner Circle at NATO with a status report on the achievements and results of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan as well as KFOR in the Balkans. While doing so he also pointed to a number of imminent capability gaps, which needed to be bridged in order to accomplish missions successfully. In the following, we present a slightly edited version of General Craddock’s statements.

ISAF Statistics

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan remains NATO’s primary operational effort. With more than 47,000 servicemen and women from 40 NATO and Non-NATO partner nations on the ground in Afghanistan we are indeed making progress. This progress may not be as fast and as farreaching as we would like, but there is progress.
In creating a safe and secure environment IAF has geographically constrained the opposing military forces’ability to conduct sustained activity. 70% of the security incidents in 2007 occurred in only 10% – or 40 – of the 396 districts in Afghanistan . These 40 districts are home to only 6% of Afghanistan ’s population. So far in 2008, 91% of insurgent activity has been reported in just 8% of the districts.

National Forces and Local Development

NATO is working diligently to help the Afghan Government develop its forces so that it can ultimately provide for its own security without outside assistance. The Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to grow in size and combat capability. Today, it exceeds the size of ISAF. It plays a leadership role in 25% of military operations in Afghanistan today – and in the most hotly contested regions. The ANA participates in 90% of all ISAF operations.
Conversely, the Afghan National Police Force, which has grown quickly in numbers, continues to lag significantly behind the Afghan National Army in professional ability. Police performance urgently needs to be enhanced. Recent pay and structural reforms will indeed help, but corruption, criminality and a lack of qualified leadership remain the most pressing issues.
In the area of reconstruction and development we are finally starting to see progress. To date, more than 7,500 civil-military cooperation projects – from ramps that improve access to schools to a ring road that facilitates national and international commerce – have been launched across Afghanistan , 75% of which are now complete. The IMF projects’ real GDP growth exceeded 13% in the fiscal year ending in March 2008.
The education of Afghanistan ’s children continues to move forward in most regions. Enrollment exceeds 6 million students, including more female students than ever before.
In 2001 8% of the Afghan population had access to some form of healthcare. Today, that number exceeds 80%. Child mortality rates have been reduced by 25% since 2001, and 16 million vaccinations against childhood diseases have been administered in the last five years.
Despite the negative reports dominating the airwaves and editorial pages in recent months I remain firm in my conviction that NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan are making a positive difference. We are succeeding. We are making the lives of the vast majority of Afghans better, and we are creating the conditions for a better future.

Kosovo Force

In Kosovo perhaps what is most remarkable is that, which is largely unremarkable. In the aftermath of Kosovo’s declaration of independence the security situation in this fledgling nation remains relatively calm – but fragile. We all know the history in this war-torn region: The stability that the residents of Kosovo are experiencing today is the direct effect of outstanding work of nearly 16,000 troops from 34 NATO and Non-NATO nations that make up the Kosovo Force (KFOR). In this time of uncertainty KFOR continues to provide a safe and secure environment for all the people of Kosovo, regardless of their ethnicity or location. KFOR will not tolerate any acts of provocation or violence. While performing this mission KFOR is in the very delicate situation of necessitating impartiality. KFOR must not be seen as endorsing or renouncing Kosovo’s independence. Rather, it will merely maintain security. I am confident that the professionalism demonstrated by our alliance in Kosovo will ensure a safe and secure environment. Peace remains the backdrop of discussions abut Kosovo’s future.

Capability Requirements

In Afghanistan , Kosovo, the Mediterranean Sea and elsewhere NATO is engaged in collective security, but the fact is: We can do it better! NATO troops are making a difference in operations around the world, and they are doing it in spite of a lack of some capabilities – critical capabilities. The battlefields of today and to morrow are not the battlefields of a cold war NATO. We need new capabilities to succeed on these asymmetric irregular battlefields. Capabilities such as:

• First: A joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance architecture capable of persistent surveillance in a wide area; an area that includes air, land, sea, space, and even cyberspace. It must support real-time data dissemination, enabling a true common operational picture and bringing critical information for decision makers at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels.
  Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) can provide us with that wide-area surveillance, giving us the capability to efficiently employ tactical assets and thereby enabling effective engagement of adversaries while reducing the risk of collateral damage.
  This full-motion video is essential on today’s irregular warfare battlefield. It must be real-time with flexible downlinks to multiple stations. Today we rely on national contributions that may well have rotational or geographic limitations – as well as limits on the duration of routine support.
  NATO must have a reliable backbone for this future ISR architecture, namely AGS – a requirement recently reaffirmed at the Bucharest Summit.
• Second: Airlift, both inter-theatre and intra­theatre. An inter-theatre capability gives us the reach to operate at strategic distance. NATO reaffirmed its commitment to crisis response in its recent comprehensive political guidance. Without strategic airlift crisis response simply cannot be timely.
  The intra-theatre airlift capability, among others, gives us the responsiveness we need to capitalise on the robust and timely ISR system I have just mentioned. Even the best equipped forces are rendered ineffective if we do not have the flexibility to move them expeditiously within a theatre of operations. I want to specifically mention helicopters. As everyone, including the opposing militant forces in Afghanistan ,knows, helicopters remain a critical shortfall in operations, particularly in ISAF. Without adequate numbers of helicopters we sub-optimise our enormous technical advantage.
• Third: Computer and information systems, a robust CIS network that enables information superiority. Information superiority is imperative to the conduct of operations in the 21st century. Information, without the ability to get it at the right time, in the right format, to the right user, rapidly loses its value. And the ability to generate a common operational picture is an essential enabler for both ground and air forces.
• Fourth: Missile defence. I think that we all agree that the proliferation of ballistic missiles poses an increasing threat to the Alliance . We must explore ways to integrate the European-based U.S. missile defence capability with current NATO missile defence efforts to ensure that NATO forces and NATO nations are fully protected against short, intermediate and long-range missile attacks by a rogue nation or nations.
• Fifth: Those capabilities that are part of the defence against terrorism programme – including offensive and defensive force protection measures – will always be in high demand on the asymmetric battlefields of the 21^st century. Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IEDs) are an excellent example. C-IED is a complex process that includes effective measures to directly counter IEDs – forensic analysis of these devices as well as effective JISR. The DAT programme has been a true success, but we still need to work on timely delivery of the technology to translate research successes into operational capabilities.
• Sixth: Finally, I wish to simply mention Special Operation Forces. By their nature these forces are small, flexible, agile and responsive. By focussing on this area we have the potential to fill some capability gaps less expensively than we could with conventional forces. Perhaps most importantly in the procurement of these and other capabilities, I ask you to keep an eye toward interoperability. In an Alliance of 26 – soon to be 28 – nations the necessity for interoperability cannot be overemphasised. If we are to act as an alliance, we must operate effectively together. Absent interoperability – this is simply unachievable.
  

Conclusion and Outlook

Yes, we are short in capabilities, critical capabilities.Yet, in the end, our transformation is about more than just today’s materiel shortfalls. NATO must continue to adjust to the rapid changes confronting European, American and, indeed, global security. The Alliance is continuously confronted with instability, humanitarian crises, regional conflict and terrorism on a multi-national scale. This is the reality of the 21^st century.
We are now entering a most challenging period of transformation, adapting not only to the realities of a changed Europe , but also to those of a changed world. NATO is taking important steps to complete its transformation from a static, reactive alliance focussed largely on territorial defence to an expeditionary, flexible alliance that world’s with members and partners to deter and defeat the spectrum of 21^st century threats confronting our collective system.
Just as the 21^stcentury security environment demands an agile, flexible force capable of rapid response in times of crisis, procurement of capabilities in this environment must follow the same model. In April, the Conference of National Armaments Directors met to tackle these and other issues. NATO member nations are working collectively and individually to transform our processes to enable a rapid and effective delivery of emerging critical capabilities; and I would note that this transformation must be more akin to revolution than evolution.
We must recognise and accept that individual nations may not be able to afford to unilaterally procure and operate complex and expensive systems required to fill the capability gaps. AGS is an excellent example. Through cooperation NATO nations can participate collectively in a programme they cannot afford individually. I do see this technique as the way ahead for our Alliance .
In the end we need a flexible approach – supported by appropriate budgets – that actively calls on NATO nations to find cooperative solutions for commonly agreed requirements. Only then can we best execute the military tasks directed by our political leaders. Dr. Wörner said that you can only steer the direction of change if you yourself became part of this change. I ask all involved to become part of this change. Embrace the change. We need a concerted, cooperative, cohesive effort today to ensure our Alliance is positioned for success in tomorrow’s security environment.

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